Turkey’s ‘big move’ of cutting economic ties with Israel probably won’t last

Turkey has suspended trade and airspace access to Israel, but past patterns suggest rhetoric may outpace impact as Israel adapts and Ankara weighs its own costs.

Turkey announced Friday that it is cutting all economic and commercial ties with Israel. Turkish ports would be closed to Israeli vessels. Turkish ships will be barred from Israeli harbors. Israeli aircraft will not be allowed in Turkish airspace.

Many hours after the announcement, Turkish diplomatic sources said that the closure of airspace only applies to official Israeli government planes as well as aircraft carrying weapons to Israel, and not to civilian flights. Still, the Turkish government has yet to make an official announcement regarding this clarification.

The measures mark a sharp escalation in already tense relations, though experience shows Ankara’s declarations often sound tougher than their actual impact.

The question is not whether these measures sting in the short term, but whether they will endure or materially change the balance between the two countries. Israel has navigated Turkish restrictions before, with more noise than bite. The country’s diversified supply chains and its habit of building redundancies give it room to maneuver.

Consider the numbers. In 2023, two-way trade was roughly $7 billion. Turkish exports to Israel accounted for about six percent of Israel’s total imports, and Israeli exports to Turkey were in the range of $1.5-$1.6 billion.

When Ankara tightened the screws, the Bank of Israel stated that the economy’s “open” structure helped mitigate the shock and that the impact on imports and prices was limited. In other words, Israel found substitutes at a rapid pace, including for sensitive inputs such as cement.

Enforcement has also proved inconsistent. “Sweeping” proclamations in 2024 were followed by reports of goods moving via third countries. Reuters reported that Turkish exporters with firm orders quickly explored routes through hubs such as Greece, Bulgaria, or Romania once the ban hit.

A Reuters data graphic later highlighted a jump in recorded exports to the Palestinian territories, raising questions about whether some goods were still reaching Israel after transshipment.

Even during the boycott period, practice diverged from politics in surprising ways. As the Post reported in August 2024, “IDF bases are powered by [a] Turkish-owned plant,” an awkward reminder that business realities, long-term contracts, and infrastructure ties rarely stop on a dime. That dissonance is not an argument for complacency; it is a reason to treat Ankara’s latest move as pressure, not permanence.

Erdogan makes bold statements, weak actions

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rhetoric has consistently escalated alongside these steps, often framing Israel in apocalyptic terms to satisfy domestic politics and regional positioning. Yet the economic and diplomatic calculus points in another direction.

Turkey remains a NATO member that depends on Western markets and investment. A prolonged freeze on all Israel-related trade, shipping, and overflight would also exact costs on Turkish producers who value access to Israel’s consumer market and to Israeli technology and services.

The rivalry is part of a wider competition that stretches from the eastern Mediterranean to northern Syria. In April, the Post reported that Israel and Turkey were exploring a “deconfliction mechanism in Syria,” with the aim to “prevent friction” as both operate in the same battle space. A companion analysis argued that such a channel is necessary given the pace of Israeli air activity and Ankara’s ambitions to shape Syria’s future.

What should Israel do now? First, keep the temperature low and the logistics nimble. Importers have already diversified toward Europe and Asia. The government should accelerate regulatory smoothing for substitute suppliers, monitor spot prices for key materials, and publish regular updates on supply chains to reassure consumers and builders alike.

Second, treat the embargo as a strategic lesson, not just an inconvenience. Reducing single-country dependencies is prudent, and the last year has shown that private ingenuity, combined with clear government signals, can close gaps.

Third, maintain focus on the strategic theater where miscalculation would be most costly. If there is a real channel to coordinate in Syria, Israel should test it, carefully and quietly, with clear redlines. This does not mean normalizing relations with Ankara on Turkey’s terms – it means minimizing operational risk where both sides already operate, while continuing to expose and counter Turkish support for actors that threaten Israeli security.

In the near term, expect more drama than transformation. Turkey may enforce the new measures tightly for weeks or months; a complete and enduring rupture is unlikely. Turkish products can still reach Israel through third-party hubs, and Israeli buyers will lean harder on alternate suppliers, which reduces Ankara’s leverage over time.

The smart bet is that, after the shouting, practice will again creep ahead of proclamation.